Key points:
- Martin frames America First as an ordering of priorities, not a retreat, and claims Trump has extended U.S. influence further than any president since Reagan.
- The December 2025 National Security Strategy declared the era of America propping up the world order like Atlas over, and a January defense strategy told allies to manage their own security.
- Foreign Affairs warns that allies may drift away, while Axios noted a gap between the strategy and actual policy.
- Libya's Turkish pivot and the scheduled exit of UNIFIL show how quickly vacuums fill.
The doctrine on paper
Martin's argument deserves a fair statement. In an interview with Nick Zifcak published by The Epoch Times, he ties Trump's agenda to natural law and statutory law, from the executive's duty to deport, to the use of tariffs, to court cases rewriting precedent such as Chevron deference. In an excerpt published by American Greatness, he casts the president's Riyadh theme of commerce over chaos as the positive half of the doctrine and the demand that allies carry their share as its necessary negative half. Good fathers, he writes, raise adults rather than dependents. He also credits Trump with forcing Europe to stop coasting on American protection and with saving NATO from irrelevance. By his account, Trump has extended American hegemony further than any president since Reagan.
The administration's own documents give the slogan its teeth. The National Security Strategy released Dec. 5, 2025, declared that the days of the United States propping up the world order “like Atlas” are over. It introduced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine - the 1823 principle that the Western Hemisphere is off limits to outside powers - pledging to block foreign adversaries from acquiring key ports, telecommunications systems and infrastructure across Latin America. It also rejected entanglement in “forever wars.” PBS framed the open question as whether the document is a wish list or a road map for a new world order.
A Pentagon defense strategy followed in January, telling allies to take control of their own security and placing dominance in the Western Hemisphere ahead of countering China, according to The Associated Press. That same week, Trump threatened tariffs on European partners to press a bid to acquire Greenland before announcing a deal that lowered the temperature. Even sympathetic readers should note what Axios observed: a gap exists between the written strategy and Trump's actual policy a year into his second term.
Burden-sharing complaints are old. Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969 pressed Asian allies to carry more weight, and presidents of both parties have grumbled about free riders since NATO's founding in 1949. But analysts at War on the Rocks describe a dilemma the slogan glosses over: some argue that unequal burden-sharing is the price Washington pays to keep partners dependent, which preserves American leadership and control over its alliances. Cut the leash and the dog may roam. Researchers at India's Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses add that Trump's pressure campaign, built on public shaming, troop-withdrawal threats and explicit “pay or else” demands, raised allied defense spending at the cost of trust and cohesion.
Vacuums have owners
A partner, by definition, has interests of its own, and this week supplied two demonstrations. In Libya, NATO member Turkey secured the signature of Khalifa Haftar's parliament on a maritime map that Greece, another NATO member, and the European Union reject. Ankara is a partner, not a dependent, and it is behaving exactly like one. In Lebanon, the U.N. peacekeeping mission that has stood between Israel and Hezbollah since 1978 is scheduled to end Dec. 31, after the Security Council voted last year, under U.S. pressure, to wind it down. Washington has categorically rejected extending it, L'Orient Today reports, while EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned against a “security vacuum.” France and Italy have floated a European force instead.
A Foreign Affairs essay cautions that allies who have not yet defected may start to drift away, and reminds those hoping to keep placating Trump that “hope is not a strategy.” Martin's supporters would answer that strength rebuilt at home and burdens shared abroad make alliances sturdier, and Pentagon officials point to allies beginning to step up, especially in Europe and South Korea. Skeptics counter that a doctrine should be judged by who controls the ports, the peacekeeping mandates and the shipping lanes once the speeches end.
The honest verdict is that the book is a campaign for a narrative, and narratives are cheap. Readers who care about the facts should keep score on the ground: how many allies buy American arms versus rival patronage, how many vacuums fill with friendly hands, and whether partners remain partners when their interests diverge from Washington's. Slogans reassure. Outcomes decide.
Sources include:
Please contact us for more information.
