In his first English-language interview, given to The Jerusalem Post, Feyn revealed new details about the plot, including a targeted killing of a Hezbollah operative to protect the operation, Iran's near discovery of the scheme, and internal Israeli debates over timing. [1] The operation on September 17-18, 2024, killed at least 42 people and injured more than 3,500, according to reports. [2]
According to Feyn's book, around July 2024 the head of Mossad (identified in the real world as David Barnea) requested that the Israeli air force eliminate a Hezbollah technology reviewer who was close to uncovering the beeper plot. [1] The Mossad tricked the operative into traveling to southern Lebanon, where he was killed in an airstrike. [1]
Feyn told the Post that “the situation was problematic” and that the Mossad had to act when problems did not resolve on their own. [1] The killing did not end Hezbollah's suspicions but delayed discovery long enough for Israel to proceed with the operation. [1]
The book describes a separate incident in which Iran came close to exposing the operation, according to Feyn. Hezbollah asked the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to inspect a beeper, planning to bring one to Tehran for higher-level technological review. [1] Feyn explained that Iranian technology checks were of a higher standard than Hezbollah's, making this the most dangerous moment for the operation. [1]
The Mossad and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) disagreed on the urgency, with the Mossad arguing that the Iranians were about to expose the beepers, forcing early activation in mid-September 2024. [1] The operation was launched partly due to this threat, according to the book. [1]
Feyn revealed that a Mossad agent named "Einat" (a composite character) connected with a woman called "Theresa" from an existing company that already worked with Hezbollah. [1] The Mossad coached Theresa to pitch the beepers to Hezbollah, which was under pressure to replace its aging communication devices that were no longer being sold. [1]
The operation used unwitting third parties, including Gold Apollo of Taiwan and BAC Consulting of Hungary. [3] Feyn said the Mossad later tried to compensate these parties where possible, though the CEO of BAC Consulting, Cristiana Barsony-Arcidiacono, later disappeared. [1] The agency “soul searches” regarding collateral damage, Feyn stated. [1]
The book recounts a September 2024 meeting in which IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi argued against immediately using the beepers, fearing a premature war. [1] The Mossad chief pushed for activation, comparing the operation to a pregnancy that could not be aborted. [1]
Another debate concerned whether to use walkie-talkies the day after the beepers. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to proceed, according to Feyn, which threw Hezbollah into further confusion. [1] Feyn acknowledged that the operation carried personal costs for Mossad families, but said strong foundations could emerge stronger under stress. [1]